An analysis of challenging the Commissioner’s discretionary powers invoked in terms of s74A and 74B of the ITA 58 of 1962, in light of the Constitution of the Republic of SA 108 of 1996

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR ROBERT C WILLIAMS

This thesis deals with the relevant law up to 30 September 2012.
This thesis analyses the inter-relationship in particular between ss 1(c), 33, 41(1), 195(1) and 237 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (‘the Constitution’) (collectively referred to as ‘constitutional obligations’); s 4(2) of the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 (‘SARS Act’); the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’); and a decision by the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (‘the Commissioner’ or ‘SARS’, as the case may be) to exercise his powers under ss 74A and 74B of the
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘ss 74A and 74B of the Income Tax Act’) by requiring taxpayers to produce or provide information, documents and things at the commencement of an inquiry or audit of taxpayers, and concludes that such a decision constitutes ‘administrative action’ as defined in s 1 of PAJA, or, alternatively is subject to the constitutional principle of legality.